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The number one concern on the agenda for most European intelligence services has been, 
for the last couple of years, the issue of the so-called ‘foreign fighters’: individuals travelling 
from Europe to Syria in order to take part in the holy war – mostly filling the ranks of IS 
(Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and Jabhat al-
Nusra (The Support Front, an al Qaeda affiliate in Syria). Evidently, the worry of the 
intelligence services is not so much the fact that these individuals leave, but rather that they 
might come back, and in particular what they might do when they return. Historically, 
foreign fighters have not been deemed a potential danger to their country of origin. If at all, 
their stories would rather be placed in the context of romantic narratives of idealism and 
sacrifice for the right cause – be it the anti-fascist fight in Spain, or the establishment of the 
state of Israel. The experiences of Europeans taking part in the Yugoslavian war, be it on the 
side of the Serbian, Bosnian or Croat military forces almost passed unnoticed and certainly 
did not unleash the kind of panic ‘Syrian’ fighters currently do.  
Primarily, what has changed is the overall framing and perception of the kind of conflict 
foreign fighters are involved in. If in previous wars the question of who were the ‘good guys’ 
and the ‘bad guys’ was a matter of perspective, the brand of radical Islamism promoted by IS 
appears to decidedly position itself outside any attempt to characterize their doings as a 
‘good cause’. Given the increasingly gruesome atrocities perpetrated by this group against 
civilians, religious minorities, and not least fellow Muslims, this is not surprising. While the 
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idea of a caliphate might not necessarily appall some audiences, the way in which the group 
intends to achieve it certainly does. The much discussed beheadings of Westerners have 
perplexed viewers around the world and there is also a sense of novelty to this particular 
treatment of hostages or ‘enemies’. But this perception is skewed, most probably due to the 
fact that these cases involve Western victims and Western executioners. As scholars of 
jihadi imagery in general, and IS in particular will know, this is only the continuation of a 
long trail of bloodshed and, when compared to other beheading videos, not even the most 
extreme examples.   
What has also changed compared to past decades is the nature and impact of this conflict. It 
is in the nature of terrorism for it to publicize its cause through deeds, and often beyond 
national borders. Contemporary terrorism is furthermore boosted by the gains of modern 
technology and communications, with a rapid and broad potential impact not just at the 
point where a terrorist act emerges, but around the world. The reverberations of 
international Islamist terrorism in Europe are illustrated by evidence that the more 
successful plots here were directed or at least influenced by returnees from jihad battlefields 
– the so-called ‘veterans’. The concern is therefore now that the foreign fighters in Syria will 
return with the training and expertise gathered on the frontline of international terrorism 
and use it to prepare terror attacks in Europe, or at least inspire others to radicalize. 
Needless to say, with the increasing numbers of European nationals and converts filling 
their ranks, the perspective of local knowledge, easy travel and inconspicuousness must also 
be included in the equation. This alarming scenario is however only one of the many 
possible outcomes of the foreign fighters’ combat activities abroad and is not even the most 
probable. Based on previous experience with soldiers at war, returnees tend to come back 
traumatized or tired of fighting or indeed scarred for life by the kinds of atrocities 
experienced. It is well known that the reality of war usually does not match the idealized 
images that usually drive young men onto the battlefield. Additionally, in this particular 
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case, it might be argued that inexperienced, spoiled young men from Europe would either 
quickly give in to the hardship of war, or simply be thrown in the front lines as ‘cannon 
fodder’. On the other hand, from the experience with war returnees it is also known that 
every now and then one will throw a tantrum and shoot aimlessly in a school yard or at 
home. The recent episode of Islamist terror in Brussels, where several people were killed in 
a Jewish museum, was the act of a returnee from Syria. Mr. Nemmouche is one of out of the 
2,000 plus European foreign fighters currently estimated to have gone to Syria. It is not at 
all clear whether his radicalization occurred in Syria, or at an earlier point in time, or 
whether indeed his decision to commit the attack can be meaningfully linked to events, 
ideas or an assignment he might have received there. Yet the fact that he came back and 
perpetrated a terror attack seems to be sufficient proof of the thesis: foreign fighters pose a 
potential danger on their return. For the ones who, for various reasons, failed to achieve the 
anticipated glory on the battlefield and are still convinced that they believe in the right 
ideology, the prospect of redemption through an attack in Europe, or at least a career as 
recruiter or preacher, might in fact appear attractive. In yet another scenario, if IS might 
decide to switch to the ‘distant enemy’ strategy, European individuals might be purposefully 
sent back home for more efficient exploitation of human resources; they are already being 
employed now with a view to influence Western audiences.  Should the promised 
European support for anti-IS forces materialize and have some palpable effect on the 
ground, such a strategy might well be considered. All in all, even if the majority of foreign 
fighter returnees are harmless, it suffices for only one or two to decide to, or be prompted to 
do something once back home. Probabilities usually escalate with the increase in total 
numbers, and the numbers of Europeans travelling to Syria is on the rise.  
In response, governments have stepped up their criminalization of acts preceding terrorism 
to include travel and training abroad, while ingenious solutions are being sought to prevent 
individuals from travelling in the first place. Needless to say, given that it is both easy to 
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cross the border between Turkey and Syria, and that there is no particular reason why 
people should be stopped from travelling to Turkey, such measures are doomed to failure. 
However, there is yet another reason why the current approach to the issue of foreign 
fighters has little chance of success, namely that the very nature of the phenomenon has not 
been understood. European governments draw some vague comparisons with returnees 
from Afghanistan and essentially hope to identify and stop as many as possible before or 
after their trip to Syria. Following the crisis of the recent beheadings, President Obama 
announced a more sweeping measure which amounts to nothing less than the destruction of 
IS. So, while the Europeans are trying to manipulate the supply, the US is aiming to cut 
down the demand; both are strategies fairly consistent with the tradition of counterterrorism 
which largely evades the human element. In spite of almost a decade and a half of post 9/11 
dealings with radicalization and, more recently, ‘violent extremism’ there is still little known 
on the question of why individuals go there to fight, and do so in such a vile manner. 
In all fairness, the ‘why’ question was not a major preoccupation before the emergence of IS, 
in spite of inflammatory media articles published after each terror attack, expressing time 
and time again shock and awe at the kinds of acts apparently ‘normal’ individuals can end 
up committing. Isolated scholars have deplored the academic ignorance of terrorist 
subjectivity; while in other formulations it is basically the terrorists’ fault that their political 
objectives are not heard, since the brutality of their acts blindfold governments to their 
causes. Finally, others accuse governments of willingly and strategically promoting the 
image of the fanatic criminal, which then allows them to pursue their power politics and 
justify illegal measures. Only a handful of scholars have seriously inquired into individual 
circumstances and motives to engage in terrorism. Given the shocking brutality of the most 
recent IS performances, there is arguably even less temptation to do so.  
Yet the subjective reasons behind the choice of some European individuals to join the jihad 
in Syrian remain relevant, even vital for the understanding of this third wave of European 
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jihadism. One obvious reason for this is the fact that ‘objective’ root causes are a rather thin 
basis for explanation. As social movements scholars have long observed, grievance is 
ubiquitous, while protest and violence are not. A particularly telling and current example 
here is found in political oppression and the thirst for democracy and human rights. For 
example, the large majority of individuals leaving Austria to fight in Syria are Chechen 
refugees, who, paradoxically, are choosing to die in a foreign conflict, after having escaped 
repression at home and finally arriving in a safe and democratic country. What is it that 
motivates these individuals, since the pursuit of democracy, human rights, and, in the end 
personal safety certainly do not?   
Some individuals join the conflict out of genuine humanitarian interests or driven by 
political utopias about building an ideal Islamic state; some see in this an opportunity for 
material enrichment, particularly if they act in auxiliary roles such as smugglers; some join 
the bandwagon without knowing much of the realities on the ground only to find 
themselves caught up in the dynamic of war and unable to leave. These kinds of motivations 
are essentially not different to the ones that moved the first and second wave jihadis to join 
local conflicts in Muslim countries or the global jihad proffered by Al Qaeda. The overall 
subjective understanding of their actions has also not changed; similar in this sense to other 
types of political activism and professional crime, jihad is something they ‘do’, a type of 
occupation that unlike other ‘regular’ occupations, demands total commitment and 
maximum investment of personal time and resources. There is however a major difference; 
an essential additional and prominent quality that makes contemporary European jihadism 
a new, and at first sight, an incomprehensible phenomenon. Contemporary European 
jihadism abroad is first and foremost a subculture. It is about lifestyle, experience and self-
performance, and less about politics and religion.  
The majority of individuals that go to Syria are notorious for their lack of religious and 
political knowledge, perhaps not surprising given their increasingly young age. Their 
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radicalization pathways are more often than not impressively short, and the excitement they 
express at the prospect of leaving more readily resembles a teenager’s fascination with the 
exotic and the forbidden. The torrent of videos and pictures on the various types of social 
media serves without a doubt propaganda and recruitment efforts, but for the ones who post 
them, they are a real chance to project oneself, to perform, to be famous on a world stage 
with a world audience. This is not to say that other motivations, such as political, 
humanitarian or spiritual ones might not play any role at all. The subcultural side of it is 
very prominent though, with selfies, and a mix of mainstream and traditional symbols and 
style. This also explains why the majority of recruits tend to be male, rather young, and 
quite eager to show and prove themselves, while maintaining a distinct allure of cool. The 
Syrian jihad offers the perfect opportunity to do just that.    
This new quality of jihad already emerged some years ago, before Syria, at the border area 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Scores of Europeans went there to undoubtedly fight 
the infidels, but primarily to help establish the first ‘real’ Islamic state. Many of them went 
there with wives and children, attempted to bond with the locals, but mostly lived in 
relatively isolated communities – in principle not so distinct to the earlier hippie communes; 
were it not for the rather strict separation of sexes and rather frequent resort to financial 
support from parents and families at home. As ideals faded away under drone fire or the 
prospect of dying an insignificant death, Waziristan lost its appeal and a new promised land 
appeared at the horizon.  
The Syrian jihad presents itself in a much more attractive package than any of the jihads 
before it. As some commentators have already noted, as opposed to Al Qaeda, IS has not 
just promised, but also materially delivered on the promise of an incipient Caliphate. This is 
not surprising, given the significant amount of material resources and weaponry the group 
can draw upon and the relatively little Western control over both its workings and those of 
its financiers. For the individual fighter, participating in this ‘project’ translates into 
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personal achievement and effectiveness – one is not just fighting for a dream, but can 
actually see the results of one’s actions in real time.   
The subcultural side of things has also gained in profile and thus salience. The community 
of sympathizers and wannabe heroes communicate and act out on the various types of social 
media, where short and penetrating statements combine with equally penetrating and 
oftentimes shocking images in overall real time performances. The purpose is to have gone 
there, done it, and then show it to the world. Selfies depict poses with guns and weaponry 
and Hollywood style professional pictures with anti-Western and jihadi slogans. Often 
‘showing’ means holding up a severed head, in a pose which has so much become a cliché 
that the very humanity, pain, and gruesomeness of the act is overshadowed by kitsch. Only 
by seeing such poses and beheading acts as performances, can it become intelligible why 
pleasure and excitement have replaced empathy and revulsion. Only in this context, can 
one begin to understand the excitement of 16 year olds, male and female, at the prospect of 
joining: to emulate, produce and distribute self-actualizations on the net.  
But there is more to the jihadi subculture than just the pictures on the web and the 
community of enthusiasts. There is the propagation of lifestyle: ‘jihadi hipster’ with modern 
clothes and hairdos, gangsta cool, with villas, swimming pools and women, and testosterone 
kicks captured in lines such as ‘real struggles need real men’, all wrapped up in religiously 
inspired recipes encouraging polygamy, the hijab, and martyrdom. And there is an entire 
arsenal of symbols and clothes that craftily combine the archaic, the religious and the 
contemporary cool. The sympathizer feels special, part of the community of the chosen, 
precisely because they bind themselves to antiquated rules, wear and do things that are as 
far away from European cultural mainstream as it can be. At the same time, the combination 
of this conscious archaism with Western products, from crew necks, zip jackets and hoodies 
to American caps or even cowboy hats, trainers and army clothing ensures that they do not 
have to feel in any way frumpy or give up the benefits of pop culture. It is in a word the 
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perfect package to ensure the most extreme level of protest, while still freely navigating 
contemporary coolness. It is perhaps no coincidence that two of the most prominent 
European jihadis in Syria are two former rappers: Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary from the UK 
and Deso Dogg (Denis Cuspert) from Germany.   
Another subcultural dimension that should not be overlooked in this seemingly harmless 
production and re-production of excitement and experience is the dimension of violence as 
pleasure. Not unlike other scenes of extreme political activism, the jihadi scene will also 
attract individuals who are not only prone to violence, but also who genuinely enjoy 
committing it. For them, the Syrian jihad is the ideal place to go on the rampage, play with 
guns and commit all sorts of crimes with impunity, and in fact even enjoy recognition and 
fame for them. While no precise numbers are known, anecdotal evidence depicts time and 
time again histories of previous involvement in crime and organized crime before the 
‘discovery’ of the jihadi way. 
What to do then about the new jihadi subculture? As a manifestation of contemporary 
youth culture, and currently enjoying a level of attraction, presence and global circulation 
without competition, there is not much one can do, except for trying to deconstruct and lay 
bare the individual dreams of stardom for what they really are, and hoping that it will at 
some point go out of fashion. Since, however, it could not thrive in the absence of an anchor 
conflict to supply the opportunity and the justification, it is this very conflict that should be 
addressed and stopped. Political subcultures grow on conflicts, ideally ones that lend 
themselves to easy explanations and attribution of blame, and ones whose causes 
homologically fit with the respective frames of anti-establishment protest. While the 
necessity of ending the massacre in Syria is beyond doubt, history tells us that this will 
neither be the first nor the last conflict for foreign fighters to join. 
 
 
 
